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REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL JUVENILE
INCARCERATION MODELS AS A
BLUEPRINT FOR REHABILITATIVE
REFORM OF JUVENILE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Robert Laird*
Adolescence marks a unique and transformative time in a person’s
physical, emotional, and intellectual development and requires special
considerations in the realm of criminal justice. This Comment explores how
rehabilitative models of criminal justice are better suited than punitive
models to recognize and accommodate the intricacies and special factors
inherent in juvenile delinquency and uses examples from regional
international bodies to illustrate how the United States can adopt measures
that align with modern-day neurology and psychiatry. First, this Comment
explores the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders as adolescent, semiautonomous individuals who are more likely to be incompetent to stand trial
than adult offenders. Second, this Comment demonstrates how rehabilitative
theories of punishment, rather than retributive theories, better align with the
unique characteristics of adolescence. Third, this Comment shows how the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights have embraced rehabilitative juvenile justice programs and how
member states have integrated those ideals to varying degrees and in
imaginative ways. This Comment also explores how the United States
remains uniquely committed to a more punitive retributive regime that rose
J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. Thank you to everyone who helped edit,
review, and produce this Comment. Professor Stephen P. Sawyer introduced me to the
regional international human rights courts and provided thoughtful feedback in the early stages
of this Comment. Members of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology were
instrumental in editing and finalizing this Comment. I am particularly grateful for the work of
Miranda Roberts, Emily Grant, Teresa Manring, Isabel Mattson, and Corinna Goodman.
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to prominence in the 1980s and fails to deter juvenile delinquency or reduce
recidivism. Finally, this Comment proposes five moderate steps that states
can adopt, without abandoning goals to reduce recidivism or deter crime, to
reflect evolving international norms and to better embody the traditional
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) and it has been adopted with “global support” by almost
every country in the world. 1 Article 37(b) of the CRC establishes broad
guidelines for the incarceration and detention of juvenile offenders and
provides that the “arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child . . . shall be
used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period
of time.” 2 This has led to the reformation of juvenile justice systems
throughout the world, including in Europe and Latin America, 3 as countries
have modeled their systems to comply with the CRC. It has also led the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) to develop jurisprudence that reflects the rehabilitative goals of
juvenile justice and the semi-autonomous nature of adolescents. 4 However,
although it played a major role in drafting the CRC, the United States has yet
to sign the Convention and has not taken steps to ensure that its juvenile
justice system complies with the values enumerated in the CRC. 5 Without
pressure to adhere to the standards set forth in the CRC, states within the
United States have continued to administer primarily retributive juvenile
criminal justice systems that do not embody established international norms.
This Comment argues that the United States has failed to realize the
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice and to take into account the fluid nature
and degree of adolescents’ autonomy and culpability. Accordingly, the
1
Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of the United States in the Drafting of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 185, 185 (2006). After South Sudan and
Somalia ratified the CRC in 2015, the United States remains the only country in the United
Nations not to ratify the Convention. Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country That Hasn’t
Ratified the Convention on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:30 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/treaty-ratification/theres-only-one-country-hasntratified-convention-childrens [https://perma.cc/Z7N6-RZD7]; see also G.A. Res. 44/25,
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).
2
G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at ¶ 37(b).
3
Mary Beloff, Los Adolescentes y el Sistema Penal. Elementos Para Una Discusión
Necesaria en la Argentina Actual, 6 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PALERMO 97
(2005) (discussing the history and evolution of juvenile justice systems in Latin America
broadly and in Argentina specifically).
4
See generally COMM’N MINISTERS COUNCIL OF EUR., GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON CHILD-FRIENDLY JUSTICE (2010) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES] (providing concrete recommendations for member states of the Council of
Europe to reform their juvenile justice systems); INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 9 (observing that Article 19 of the American
Convention guarantees juveniles the opportunity for rehabilitation).
5
Cohen, supra note 1, at 185–86.
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United States should adopt aspects of juvenile justice systems developed in
other countries that better embody the rehabilitative ideal. Part I of this
Comment provides background on juvenile offenders in the criminal justice
system. Specifically, Part I.A reviews the unique characteristics of juvenile
offenders and explains how adolescents lack full competency to be judged
by a criminal proceeding. Subsequently, in Part I.B, this Comment illustrates
how a punitive juvenile justice system that is justified by retributive or
deterrence theories of punishment is fundamentally inconsistent with the
broad consensus in our scientific community that juvenile offenders have
diminished agency and competency. Instead, juvenile criminal justice
systems should be focused on rehabilitative systems that reflect adolescents’
psychical, emotional, and neurological development. In Part II.A, this
Comment broadly reviews juvenile justice systems found in Europe, Latin
America, and the United States and argues that the United States’ juvenile
justice systems fail to embody the rehabilitative ideal of juvenile justice.
However, regional international courts and their member states provide
myriad examples of how to create more rehabilitative juvenile justice
systems, and Part II.B of this Comment outlines aspects of several different
systems that would fundamentally improve the United States’ juvenile
criminal systems without sacrificing legitimate public safety interests.
I. BACKGROUND
Childhood and adolescence are marked by diminished competency and
limited agency. These features make juvenile justice systems poorly suited
for traditional theories of punishment like retribution or deterrence. Instead,
they reinforce the traditional rehabilitative justification of juvenile justice
systems. This Part provides background on juvenile offenders in the criminal
justice system. Part II.A explores why children and teenagers have limited
agency and competency. It also briefly discusses the prevalence of mental
illness among juvenile offenders and its implications for agency and
competency. Part II.B discusses the impact these characteristics have for
traditional theories of punishment and concludes that juvenile justice systems
should strive to embody the rehabilitative ideal.
A. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILE AGENCY AND
COMPETENCY

Juvenile justice models internationally and in the United States broadly
treat criminal justice as a binary system; offenders are either adult or juvenile
actors. However, children are fundamentally different from teenagers, who
are fundamentally different from adults. A binary system fails to take into
account that the maturity of some child offenders should completely absolve
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them of blame, while for many adolescents, their maturity should be a
significant mitigating factor. These differences in maturity have substantial
implications for whether or not juveniles should be subject to criminal
sanctions.
1. Dependency and Childhood
Children are different from both adolescents and adults and lack the
autonomy to ever justly be subject to criminal justice systems. Children lack
the minimum capacity for blameworthiness and punishment.6 This was
recognized at common law 7 and has been codified into statutes domestically
and internationally as the criminal age of responsibility. 8 Children’s ability
to make decisions, to process information, and to consider the consequences
of alternative choices is significantly different from both adults and
adolescents. 9
The transition between childhood and adolescence is marked by
improved “intellectual, emotional, behavioral, and interpersonal
functioning.” 10 A gradual increase in logical reasoning abilities begins at
around age eleven and continues through the age of sixteen. 11 This increase
in logical reasoning abilities includes the fundamental ability to
“comprehend information relevant to a decision and . . . the ability to use this
information logically to make a choice.” 12 Simultaneously, focus on one’s
peer group increases between the ages of ten and fourteen. 13 As opposed to
adolescents, who struggle to create their own independence, children do not
consider autonomy a goal and “look to their parents to make decisions for
them.” 14 The low rate of childhood offenses reflects children’s inability to
make independent decisions. 15 Criminal offenses committed by children
under the age of twelve are almost nonexistent.16 Children, who have not
begun transitioning into adults and who are not autonomous individuals,
6
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 52 (2005) (reviewing the
principles and policy implications of separate juvenile justice systems that are responsive to
the unique implications of youth crime).
7
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 130
(2008).
8
See infra notes 110, 112, 116, 157–159, 172–173.
9
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 130.
10
Id. at 33.
11
Id. at 34.
12
Id. at 36.
13
Id. at 34.
14
Id. at 31.
15
See ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 93.
16
See ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 93.
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should not be subject to a criminal justice system that implicitly assumes
some degree of autonomy.
2. Adolescent Offenders as Limited Legal Actors
In contrast, adolescence is a period of semi-autonomy that bridges the
dependency of childhood and the independence of adulthood. 17 It is marked
by “puberty, the transition from elementary to secondary school, and the
emergence of increasingly sophisticated reasoning abilities.” 18
Despite adolescents’ increased autonomy, modern-day science on
juveniles’ physical and psychological development makes clear that
adolescent offenders should also not be considered full legal actors. 19
Adolescent offenders lack the ability to be fully responsible for their actions
because their behavior is “more likely to be shaped by developmental forces
that are constitutive of adolescence” than by “subjectively defined
preferences and values,” as found in adults. 20 Areas of the brain that implicate
“long-term planning, the regulation of emotion, and impulse control” are still
developing in adolescents. 21 Specifically, large-scale changes to the frontal
lobe and prefrontal cortex, areas of the brain that are critical to advanced
thinking, occur during an individual’s teenage years. 22 As a result,
“adolescents, as compared with adults, are more susceptible to influence, less
future oriented, less risk averse, and less able to manage their impulses and
behavior.” 23 Since “these differences likely have a neurobiological basis,”24
juvenile offenders have “greater prospects for reform,” 25 “are not as morally
reprehensible,” 26 and are therefore “less deserving of the most severe
punishments” than adults. 27
Adolescent offenders are also subject to psychological factors that
reduce their culpability. Adolescence is marked by “psychosocial maturation
17

See id. at 42.
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 34.
19
See Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How
the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 12,
27, 39–40 (2011).
20
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1015 (2003).
21
Id. at 1013.
22
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 44.
23
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 20, at 1013.
24
Id.
25
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
26
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
27
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
18
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and the maturation of the brain’s executive functions.” 28 As a result,
adolescent offenders are subject to factors that reduce their culpability that
are nonexistent in adult offenders. First, adolescents are much more
susceptible to peer pressure than adult offenders. 29 Susceptibility to peer
pressure increases between the ages of eleven and fourteen and peaks around
the ages of fourteen and fifteen. 30 Second, adolescents are also less futureoriented than adults. 31 Adolescents discount the future more heavily, and this
leads adolescents to be less risk-averse. 32 Finally, teenagers, as opposed to
adults, are more impulsive and less able to control their behavior and
choices. 33 They have a greater tendency to moodiness and to seek sensationarousing situations. 34 Collectively, these factors make juvenile delinquency
less about moral blameworthiness or culpability and more about inherent
psychological factors outside of an individual’s control.
Decisions of the regional international courts and the United States
Supreme Court have supported these scientific findings and recognized that
a juvenile offender, owing to his or her developmental immaturity, should be
viewed as less culpable than a comparable adult offender. 35 The United States
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that children under the age of
eighteen are still developing and are therefore less culpable than adults.36
28

SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 34.
Id. at 38.
30
Id. at 34, 38.
31
Laurence Steinberg, Sandra Graham, Lia O’Brien, Jennifer Woolard, Elizabeth
Cauffman & Marie Banich, Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80
CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009) (“Younger adolescents consistently demonstrate a weaker
orientation to the future than do individuals aged 16 and older, as reflected in their greater
willingness to accept a smaller reward delivered sooner than a larger one that is delayed, and
in their characterizations of themselves as less concerned about the future and less likely to
anticipate the consequences of their decisions.”).
32
Id.
33
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 43.
34
Id.
35
See infra note 36; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (“[T]he Court has
already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is
too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less
intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and
responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.”).
36
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.
261, 272 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569–70 (2005).
29
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Outside the context of criminal justice, the Supreme Court has noted that “a
child lacks [the] maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life’s difficult decisions.” 37 More recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the
Court struck down the sentencing of juvenile offenders to life without parole
absent a review of mitigating factors. 38 Justice Kagan observed that youth
status is marked as a time of “immaturity, irresponsibility, ‘impetuousness,
and recklessness.’” 39 Similarly, in an advisory opinion, the IACHR stated
that the principle that juvenile offenders require special measures “originates
from the specific situation of children, taking into account their weakness,
immaturity or inexperience.” 40 Finally, the ECHR has held that the
sentencing of juveniles “must be done with due regard for their presumed
immaturity.” 41 Because adolescents have limited competency and agency,
juvenile justice systems should account for their youth status and recognize
the physical and psychological factors that influence their actions.
3. Juvenile Justice and Mental Illness
Regardless of their age, juvenile offenders are very likely to suffer from
mental illness and, therefore, be incompetent to stand trial.42 In the United
States, “nearly 60% of male juvenile detainees and more than two-thirds of
female detainees meet diagnostic criteria for one or more psychiatric
disorders.” 43 Furthermore, “[e]ducational researchers have found that
upwards of 40 percent of incarcerated youth have a learning disability, and
they will face significant challenges returning to school after they leave
detention.” 44 When we compare the mental illness prevalence rates of youths
in the juvenile justice system to youths in the general population, the results
are similarly skewed. Youths in the juvenile justice system are four times
more likely to have a conduct disorder, roughly ten times more likely to have
a substance abuse issue, and three to four times more likely to have an

37

Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
39
Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).
40
Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC‐17/02, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 60 (Aug. 28, 2002).
41
Khamtokhu v. Russia, Apps. Nos. 60367/08, 961/11, ¶ 80 (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170663.
42
Michael L. Perlin, Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun: The International Human
Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 301, 307 (2013).
43
Id. at 308.
44
BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 2 (2006).
38
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affective disorder like clinical depression. 45 And while young people may be
more likely to have a behavioral health problem before being incarcerated,
those behavioral health problems “simply get worse in detention, not
better.” 46
The close correlation between mental illness and juvenile offenses goes
to the heart of whether or not adolescent offenders are competent to stand
trial—and the United States Supreme Court has differed from the ECHR on
this matter. Under federal law, an incompetent defendant does not understand
the “nature and consequences of the proceedings against him” or cannot
“properly assist in his defense.” 47 Therefore, if the majority of minors who
commit crimes do so as a result of a mental illness, then they may not be
competent to be judged for that crime. 48 The Supreme Court has long held
that insanity is a complete defense to criminal liability and that the Fifth
Amendment requires an inquiry into a defendant’s insanity when it is in
doubt. 49 However, the Court has never required that the insanity defense be
considered in juvenile justice systems, and some states do not even offer an
insanity defense to juvenile offenders. 50
The ECHR, on the other hand, has taken a different approach. When the
ECHR considered Germany’s diminished responsibility statute in a 2018
case, 51 it held that the defendant, a nineteen-year-old with severe sexual
45
Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Offenders and Mental Illness, 6 PSYCHIATRY PSYCH. & L. 143,
147 (1999).
46
HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 44, at 8 (“Why is the prevalence of mental illness
among detained youth so high? First, detention has become a new ‘dumping ground’ for young
people with mental health issues . . . . At the same time, new laws were enacted that reduced
judicial discretion to decide if youth would be detained, decreasing the system’s ability to
screen out and divert youth with disorders.”); id. (“[T]he kind of environment generated in the
nation’s detention centers, and the conditions of that confinement, conspire to create an
unhealthy environment. Researchers have found that at least a third of detention centers are
overcrowded, breeding an environment of violence and chaos for young people. Far from
receiving effective treatment, young people with behavioral health problems simply get worse
in detention, not better.”).
47
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
48
See Perlin, supra note 42, at 315 (detailing the connection between mental illness,
competency, and the insanity defense in the United States).
49
See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966) (“Having determined that
Robinson’s constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate hearing
on his competence to stand trial, we direct that the writ of habeas corpus must issue and
Robinson be discharged, unless the State gives him a new trial within a reasonable time.”).
50
Perlin, supra note 42, at 313.
51
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 21, https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/
?p=752#21 [https://perma.cc/HDP5-3E4K] (Ger.) (“If the capacity of the perpetrator to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or to act in accordance with such appreciation is
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sadism who murdered a woman and was at a high risk of recidivism, could
be continuously detained only for preventative, not punitive, reasons.52 The
ECHR implicitly recognized what Germany had already codified: mental
illness, while not always an exculpatory factor, may often be a mitigating
factor.
Children lack the autonomy or competency to be considered legal
actors, and teenagers, while beginning to develop autonomy and competency,
are limited legal actors. As Part I.B outlines, this has implications for the
rationale behind juvenile justice systems and traditional theories of
punishment.
B. TRADITIONAL GOALS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT

The unique characteristics of adolescent offenders have significant
implications for the rationale behind juvenile justice systems. The traditional
theories of retributivism and deterrence generally fail to take into account the
unique position of adolescent offenders. For this reason, the rehabilitative
model serves as the primary goal of domestic and international juvenile
justice systems. This Section will consider how traditional theories of
retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation each align with the juveniles’
diminished competency and agency.
1. Retributivism and Youth Offenders
The retributive rationale for criminal justice is based on the Kantian idea
of moral desert: we punish in order to preserve the dignity of the offender
and to balance the moral scales. 53 The rationale for retributive justice is
dependent on a person’s free will and is fundamentally based on the idea of
the full, rational actor. 54 Put another way, “[p]unishment that gives an
substantially diminished upon commission of the act due to one of the reasons indicated in
section 20, then the punishment may be mitigated pursuant to Section 49 subsection (1).”).
52
Ilnseher v. Germany, Apps. Nos. 10211/12, 27505/14, ¶¶ 127–128 (Dec. 4, 2018),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-187540.
53
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Mary
Gregor ed. trans., 1997) (providing the philosophical foundation for retributive criminal
justice systems).
54
Id. at 37–38 (“If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to
the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of
what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective
principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle
is: rational nature exists as an end in itself . . . . The practical imperative will therefore be the
following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”).
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offender what he or she deserves for a past crime is a valuable end in itself
and needs no further justification.” 55 However, any retributive model of
criminal punishment must adjudicate desert in accordance with justice, and
it precludes the punishment of individuals who are “not responsible for their
offense.” 56
Retributive rationales have broadly been rejected as the basis for
juvenile justice models. This is because a retributive basis for juvenile justice
would “focus on backward-looking attributions of blame” for the action,
rather than on the actor, which would make it “dangerously tempting [to
abolish] the juvenile court.” 57 Instead, the existence of a separate juvenile
justice system “recogniz[es] the diminished blameworthiness of juveniles”
and undermines the retributive justification for punishment. 58 The Supreme
Court recognized this diminished blameworthiness in Roper v. Simmons,
holding that as a result of “the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender,” the
death penalty was impermissible. 59 Similarly, the ECHR, in V. v. United
Kingdom, affirmed the language, adopted by the United Nations, that any
retributive goals of juvenile justice be outweighed by the rehabilitative
interests in “safeguarding the well-being and future of the young person.” 60
2. Societal Deterrence and Recidivism
The deterrence considerations normally at play in criminal justice
systems also do not apply well in juvenile systems. Incarcerating some
adolescents will generally not impact the decision-making of other teenagers
or have any impact on the overall offense rate. 61 As the Supreme Court has
55
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 454
(1997).
56
Id. at 477.
57
Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option, 95
IOWA L. REV. 1, 34 (2009). A retributive rationale for juvenile justice would make it easy to
abolish the entire system because in a retributive model, there is no reason to distinguish
between adult and juvenile actors. In other words, when the focus of criminal justice is
punishing past actions as an independently valuable end, the focus is on the action, not the
actor. See id. (“Treatment of juvenile offenders is not necessarily ignored, but it is not
necessary to, and in a sense is a distraction from, assigning culpability and assuring
accountability for one’s offenses.”).
58
Id. at 35.
59
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
60
V. v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 135. The dissenting opinion went
even further and found the sentence in the instant case impermissible because the “principal
reason for bringing these proceedings against children of eleven years of age was retribution
[and] vengeance is not a form of justice and in particular vengeance against children in a
civilised society should be completely excluded.” Id. at 172.
61
See infra note 64.
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recognized, this is because of three major differences between children and
adults: (1) juveniles tend to engage in reckless behavior due to their general
lack of maturity, which is still developing; (2) minors are more susceptible
to the influence of peer pressure; and (3) minors’ character traits are in the
process of development and are more likely to change over time than those
of adults. 62 As a result, adolescents will not accurately assess the risks of their
chosen course of action. However, incarceration is not designed to address
any of the three major reasons why a teenager might commit a crime. It is no
surprise, then, that “decades of research show incarceration to be the least
effective, most expensive option in treating delinquency.” 63
Similarly, reducing recidivism in the general population cannot be
addressed by incarceration in juvenile justice systems. This is primarily
because, for the majority of crimes, adolescents are not likely to reoffend.64
Instead, their tendency to commit most crimes peaks around the age of
sixteen and then dramatically decreases from the age of seventeen onward,
independent of whether or not they are incarcerated for their crimes. 65 These
relatively common “phase-specific” offenses are concentrated in
adolescents’ teenage years and include offenses like arson (ages thirteen and
fourteen), motor vehicle theft (age sixteen), larceny (age seventeen), and
burglary (age eighteen). 66 Incarceration adds nothing to the natural
development of an adolescent’s brain, which already makes recidivism
unlikely.
The exceptions to this “age-crime relationship” are particularly violent
crimes, like rape, homicide, and assault. 67 The peak age for committing these
more violent offenses is later, and the drop-off in offense rates is much more
gradual. 68 The peak age for homicide is nineteen, for rape it is twenty, and
for aggravated assault it is twenty-one. 69 Youth offense rates of these violent
crimes are also much lower than phase-specific offenses. 70 “While the ratio
of homicide arrests at age fifteen to age twenty-three is .4, the ratio of auto

62

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; see also infra Part II.A.
David J. Utter & Megan Hougard, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana: Redefining the
Role of the Advocate, 50 LA. B.J. 99, 99 (2002).
64
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 52–53.
65
See id.
66
ZIMRING, supra note 6, at 92.
67
Id. at 91, 93.
68
Id. at 91.
69
Id. at 92.
70
Id.
63
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theft arrests at age fifteen to age twenty-three is 3.67.” 71 The ephemeral
nature of phase-specific offenses, like property-related violations, suggests
that they are symptomatic of the conditions of adolescence rather than
indicative of a permanent adult characteristic. 72 Recidivism concerns that
could be addressed by incarceration in an adult criminal justice system do
not exist for most adolescent offenses. Any deterrence rationale for a juvenile
incarceration model would only apply to the small, limited group of violent
offenses like rape and murder that could be indicative of a more permanent
condition.
3. Rehabilitation, Education, Treatment, and Diversion
In contrast to the traditional retribution and deterrence theories of
punishment, rehabilitation has traditionally been considered the foundation
of juvenile justice in the United States and abroad. 73 This is because the
“uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition argues for . . . a separate
justice system, in which rehabilitation is a central aim.”74 Social reformers
during the late 1800s believed “that juveniles, unlike adults, were not
responsible for their behavior.” 75 As a result, reformers designed juvenile
courts as social welfare agencies that were distinct from adult criminal courts,
which focused on punishment. 76 These courts embraced the rehabilitative
model, which focuses on “the notions that children[] are dependent upon
adults; are developing emotionally, morally, and cognitively and, therefore,
are psychologically impressionable and behaviorally malleable; and have
different, less competent, levels of understanding and collateral mental
functioning than adults.” 77
Today, the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice systems have been
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court, the Council of Europe, and
the ECHR. The Supreme Court has long recognized the value of

71

Id. at 94. In other words, there are .4 homicides committed by a fifteen-year-old for
every homicide committed by a twenty-three-year-old. And there are 3.67 auto thefts
committed by a fifteen-year-old for every auto theft committed by a twenty-three-year-old.
72
See id.
73
See generally A Madman’s Vacation, SERIAL (Nov. 2018), https://serialpodcast.org/seas
on-three/8/a-madmans-vacation [https://perma.cc/2YBM-GA8R] (discussing the rationale for
juvenile justice systems overall).
74
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 20, at 1016.
75
Ira M. Schwartz, Neil Alan Weiner & Guy Enosh, Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the
Juvenile Court Does Not Roll over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998).
76
See id.
77
Id.
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rehabilitative justice for juvenile offenders. 78 In Graham v. Florida, 79 the
Court struck down life without parole sentences for children convicted of
nonhomicide offenses because life without parole “forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal” and “[w]hat the State must do . . . is give defendants like
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 80 Similarly, the ECHR has stated
that member states have an obligation to facilitate the rehabilitation and
reintegration of juvenile delinquents.81 It has also noted that the abolition of
life imprisonment in member states is rooted in a desire to “facilitate the
rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents.” 82 The Council of Europe has also
reiterated rehabilitative goals when children are deprived of liberty. In the
Guidelines on Child-Friendly Justice, the Committee of Ministers stated that
the incarceration of children should be focused on “reintegration into
society.” 83 The Guidelines also state that juveniles should have “regular and
meaningful contact with parents;” “receive appropriate education, vocational
guidance and training, medical care;” and have access to “programmes that
prepare children in advance for their return to their communities.” 84 The
rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice have been repeatedly affirmed by the
Supreme Court, the Council of Europe, and the ECHR.
II. ANALYSIS
Countries around the world have developed juvenile justice systems
with unique characteristics in an attempt to embody the rehabilitative ideal
of juvenile justice. This Part will review some of these systems. Part II.A will
review rehabilitative aspects of juvenile justice systems that have been
established by the ECHR, the IACtHR, and member states in the Council of
Europe and the Organization of American States in the wake of the CRC.
Specific focus will be placed on the role of incarceration of juvenile
offenders. Part II.A will also broadly review juvenile justice systems in the
United States and show that instead of embodying a rehabilitative idea of
juvenile justice that is aligned with modern-day psychiatry and neurology,
78

See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (“The objectives [of Juvenile
Courts] are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.”).
79
560 U.S. 48 (2015).
80
Id. at 74–75; see also Green, supra note 19, at 11.
81
Khamtokhu v. Russia, Apps. Nos. 60367/08, 961/11, ¶ 80 (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170663 [https://perma.cc/3NRT-EVAH].
82
Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 331.
83
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 24.
84
Id.
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they reflect retributive principles from the 1980s. Finally, Part II.B will
propose that the United States shed its current juvenile criminal justice
systems in favor of systems that draw on various international models and
minimize the incarceration of adolescents by (1) raising the age of criminal
responsibility; (2) creating a tiered system for teenagers with varying degrees
of competency; (3) significantly restricting incarceration options; (4)
investing in alternative options that divert youth offenders from the juvenile
justice system; and (5) reimagining juvenile detention centers as
rehabilitative resources that provide rigorous educational and psychological
services.
A. JUVENILE INCARCERATION MODELS INTERNATIONALLY AND IN
THE UNITED STATES

1. The Council of Europe and its Member States
The Council of Europe is Europe’s “oldest political body” and focuses
on protecting democracy and human rights within member states. 85 It was
founded in the wake of World War II in 1949 and today consists of fortyseven members states. 86 The Council of Europe executes the judgments of
the ECHR and ensures that members states comply with the European
Convention on Human Rights. 87 This sub-section explores how the Council
of Europe and various member states, including the United Kingdom, various
Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, have structured their juvenile justice
systems.
a. The Council of Europe and the ECHR
In 2010, the Council of Europe adopted the Guidelines on ChildFriendly Justice. 88 The Guidelines focus on “the best interests of children”
and dictate that “member states should make . . . concerted efforts to
establish multidisciplinary approaches” to juvenile justice. 89 The Guidelines
also echo the CRC and establish that juvenile incarceration should only be
used as a last resort. 90 Furthermore, they emphasize “the importance of
family ties and promoting the reintegration into society” and dictate that
85
What Is The Council of Europe?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/new
s/world-europe-17741526 [https://perma.cc/U83K-UE48].
86
Id.
87
Id.; see also THE COURT IN BRIEF, EUROPEAN CT. OF HUM. RTS., https://www.echr.coe.
int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRU8-QUFU].
88
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 7.
89
Id. at 18.
90
Id. at 24.
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children should be able to “maintain regular and meaningful contact with
parents”; “receive appropriate education, vocational guidance and training,
medical care, and . . . access to leisure, including physical education and
sport.” 91 The Guidelines also demand that the age of responsibility be
reasonable and that alternatives to incarceration, such as mediation and
diversion, be encouraged. 92 In many ways, the Guidelines provide details for
what the ECHR has already decided and simply “serve as a practical guide
for [member] states to implement international standards.” 93
In several cases, the ECHR has emphasized that adolescents’ immutable
limited agency and competency must be considered for countries to embody
rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice. As one example, in 1999, the ECHR
invalidated the United Kingdom’s criminal adjudication of an eleven-yearold child. 94 The Court held that it was “essential that a child charged with an
offence [be] dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level
of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities.” 95 Similarly, in 2006,
after Turkish authorities detained a sixteen-year-old for four months while
his case was pending, the ECHR held that, since the authorities did not
consider the unique status of the offender as a minor, the detention was
unlawful. 96
The ECHR also considers an offender’s age outside the context of
incarceration. In Maslov v. Austria, the ECHR overturned an expulsion order
of a sixteen-year-old adolescent who had committed a variety of criminal
offenses and held that “the decisive feature of the present case is the young
age at which the applicant committed the offences.” 97 The ECHR reached
this conclusion because it determined that the non-violent property-related
acts committed by the minor could still be “regarded as acts of juvenile
delinquency” rather than violent crimes that might justify an expulsion
order. 98 Finally, where the ECHR considered whether a ten-year-old received
a fair hearing, the court focused on the applicant’s immaturity and the
“considerable psychiatric evidence” that suggested that the applicant “found
91

Id.
Id. at 25. However, the Guidelines refrain from setting a minimum age and do not
establish a definition for “reasonable.” See generally id.
93
Ton Liefaard, Child-Friendly Justice: Protection and Participation of Children in the
Justice System, 88 TEMP. L REV. 905, 907 (2016).
94
T. v. United Kingdom, App No. 24724/94, ¶ 84 (Dec. 16, 1999), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-58593.
95
Id.
96
Selçuk v. Turkey, App. No. 21768/02, ¶¶ 34–37 (Jan. 10, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-71944.
97
Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, 304.
98
Id. at 327.
92
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it very difficult and distressing to think or talk about the events in question,
making it impossible to ascertain many aspects.” 99 The ECHR has
consistently emphasized the adolescence of juvenile offenders, the
relationship between immaturity and limited intellectual and emotional
capacities, and the rehabilitative ideals of juvenile justice.
However, despite this rhetoric, the ECHR has refrained from taking
substantive steps to curtail the punitive juvenile justice systems of some of
its member states. For instance, in V. v. United Kingdom, a ten-year-old boy
convicted of murder claimed that, under Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the United Kingdom was precluded from
enforcing a criminal age of responsibility for a ten-year-old without ensuring
that procedures and sentences be modified to reflect the age of the child. 100
The ECHR rejected the argument, holding that “there is [not] at this stage
any clear common standard amongst the member States of the Council of
Europe as to the minimum age of criminal responsibility.” 101 Therefore, “the
attribution of criminal responsibility to the applicant does not in itself give
rise to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.” 102 The ECHR’s abdication
of its responsibility to protect adolescent offenders has allowed punitive
juvenile justice systems to remain in the United Kingdom.103
The ECHR has been more active, though not steadfast, in regulating the
length of juvenile prison sentences. In T. v. United Kingdom, the ECHR held
that “a policy which ignores at any stage the child’s development and
99

V. v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 148. V. and T. were co-defendants
convicted of murder in the United Kingdom in 1999. See supra note 94.
100
Id. ¶ 86. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition of
torture, dictates that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 E.T.S. 5, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Conventio
n_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T29-5LSU].
101
V., 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 144.
102
Id. The ECHR noted that Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland all set the
criminal age of responsibility at seven, while Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg all set the
criminal age of responsibility at eighteen. Id. at 137.
103
International criminal courts have also refrained from exercising jurisdiction over
children, in effect regulating juvenile prosecution to nation states and making the ECHR’s
abdication of responsibility even more egregious. The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) excludes persons under the age of eighteen from the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 26, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544.
Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia have
refrained from setting a minimum age of criminal responsibility, though they have also
refrained from indicting anyone under the age of eighteen. Matthew Happold, The Age of
Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 69, 76 (Karin Arts & Vesselin Popovski eds.,
2006).
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progress while in custody as a factor relevant to his eventual release date is
an unlawful policy.” 104 Similarly, in Hussain v. The United Kingdom, the
ECHR held that without the use of a tariff 105 to reevaluate his prison sentence,
the applicant, because he was a sixteen-year-old boy, would be
impermissibly detained. 106
The ECHR has also developed loose standards for the detention of
minors with mental health issues. As a preliminary matter, before children
can be detained, “a medical assessment should be made of the child’s state
of health to determine whether or not he or she can be placed in a juvenile
detention centre.” 107 This principle was illustrated in a case where the ECHR
found that Russia had violated the rights of a twelve-year-old boy with
ADHD and neurosis who was hospitalized immediately after being released
from a temporary detention center because he was “not given the necessary
treatment for his condition at the temporary detention centre.” 108 However,
in the same way it has neglected to set a clear minimum age of criminal
responsibility for its member states, the ECHR has failed to describe, beyond
a prohibition on juvenile life sentences without parole, a maximum detention
length for juvenile offenders.
b. The United Kingdom
The ECHR’s deferential treatment of member states has allowed some
countries wide latitude to maintain primarily retributive, rather than
rehabilitative, juvenile justice systems. For instance, the United Kingdom,
despite criticism from the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human
Rights, 109 has lower ages of criminal responsibility 110 and more incarcerated
104
Marina Ann Magnuson, Taking Lives: How the United States Has Violated the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights by Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without
Parole, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 163, 174 n.48 (2010).
105
A tariff in the British system serves a similar function as parole in American systems.
Id. at 174 n.50.
106
Hussain v. United Kingdom, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 252, 269.
107
Blokhin v. Russia, App. No. 47152/06, ¶ 138 (Mar. 23, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.i
nt/eng?i=001-161822.
108
Id. ¶¶ 146, 149.
109
Thomas Hammarberg, A Juvenile Justice Approach Built on Human Rights Principles,
8 YOUTH JUST. 193, 195 (2008) (“In the United Kingdom, over three thousand minors are kept
in detention at any one time which means that about five thousand youngsters are given that
experience during one year. This is hardly consistent with the norm of detention as a ‘last
resort’.”).
110
Barry Goldson & John Muncie, Rethinking Youth Justice: Comparative Analysis,
International Human Rights and Research Evidence, 6 YOUTH JUST. 91, 95 (2006) (“12 in
Canada, the Netherlands and Turkey; 13 in France; 14 in Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand
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youth offenders than most other European Countries. 111 The age of criminal
responsibility is eight in Scotland and ten in England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland. 112 However, in Wales and England, the prosecutor has the burden of
proving that juvenile offenders between the ages of ten and fourteen knew
their actions were wrong. 113 These harsher punishments reflect the
importance placed on deterrence and retribution in the juvenile justice system
in the U.K. 114 Admittedly, the United Kingdom has also adopted
rehabilitative concepts into its incarceration model. Section 53(1) of the
Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 requires that “[u]ntil the age of
eighteen a child or young person detained . . . will be held at a children’s
home or other institution providing facilities appropriate to his age.” 115
Nonetheless, the British model’s retributive and punitive elements are often
under reproach from the ECHR as out of line with international norms of
juvenile justice.
c. Scandinavia
The antithesis of the British model has been adopted uniformly by the
four Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In all
four countries, the age of criminal responsibility is fifteen years. 116
Additionally, while none of these countries have a separate juvenile court
system, youth offenders between the ages of fifteen and seventeen are
supported by both the criminal justice and child welfare systems. 117
Significantly, all four countries restrict the charges that can be brought
against youth offenders. 118
and Spain; 15 in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; and 18 in Belgium and
Luxembourg.”).
111
Id. at 92 (“[T]he defining hallmark of contemporary youth justice in England and
Wales is a ‘new punitiveness’, characterized by rates of child imprisonment significantly
exceeding those found in most other industrialized democratic countries in the world.”)
(citations omitted).
112
Id. at 95.
113
V. v. United Kingdom, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 128.
114
Goldson & Muncie, supra note 110, at 99 (“Youth justice policies are increasingly
located within a wider ideological context whereby social, economic and political problems
are redefined as issues to be managed rather than resolved.”); see also V., 1999-IX Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 125 (noting that in the sentencing of two ten-year-old boys for murder, the trial judge
“subsequently recommended that a period of eight years be served by the boys to satisfy the
requirements of retribution and deterrence”).
115
V., 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 130.
116
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, 36 CRIME & JUST. 217, 225 (2007).
117
Id. at 226. For instance, Sweden uses social welfare authorities, rather than criminal
justice officials, to administer court-ordered institutional treatment. Id.
118
See id.
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Furthermore, in the majority of cases, all four countries use alternatives
to incarceration to resolve youth offenses. Probation and fines are the most
common sanctions for youth offenders. 119 In Norway, mediation is frequently
used as an independent criminal sanction to resolve offenses. 120 Denmark
uses “youth contract” programs and “youth sanction” programs. 121 “Youth
contract” programs obligate youths to participate in certain activities, which
if they complete, lead to the dropping of the charges and in some cases, a
suspended sentence. “Youth sanction” programs are “two-year programs
imposed by courts but implemented by [] social welfare authorities.” 122
As a result, juvenile offenders are incarcerated far less frequently in
these countries. Finland, for example, only allows non-suspended prison
terms for youth offenders in extraordinary circumstances. 123 Countrywide,
this has led to “about 100 (2 per 100,000) prisoners between the ages of
eighteen and twenty and fewer than ten (0.2 per 100,000) in the fifteen to
seventeen age group.” 124 Similarly, in Sweden, “[p]rison is seldom used for
the age group fifteen to seventeen (five cases in 2003), and it is relatively rare
in the age group eighteen to twenty (767 in 2003).” 125 At the heart of all four
of these systems are principles of rehabilitative justice that aim to reduce
recidivism and address the underlying issues without reverting to societal
condemnation.

119

Id.
Id. Norway was the first Scandinavian country to begin using mediation in 1981. Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.; ANETTE STORGAARD, INT’L JUV. JUST. OBSERVATORY, ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY
FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS: NATIONAL REPORT ON JUV. JUSTICE TRENDS DENMARK, 4–5 (2011).
Often times, a contract requires an offender to complete a training program or finish school.
If the offender does not complete the program, then charges remain, and in some cases, a
suspended sentence could be imposed. In rare cases, a suspended sentence could include a fine
or other penalty. Britta Kysvgaard, Youth Crime and Youth Justice: Comparative and CrossNational Perspectives, 31 CRIME & JUST. 349, 371 (2004). More severe sanctions might
include community service, with an hours requirement between thirty and three hundred. A
contract is signed by both the offender and their parents in exchange for a suspended criminal
sentence, which would be imposed if the terms of the contract are not met. STORGAARD, supra,
at 4–5. In contrast, youth sanction programs require juvenile offenders to serve time first in a
closed juvenile institution and then in an open residential institution. Id. at 6–7. However, both
centers are administered by welfare, rather than penal, institutions. Id.
123
Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 116, at 236. Non-suspended prison terms are generally
reserved for “homicides, aggravated robberies and aggravated drug offences.” TAPIO LAPPISEPPÄLÄ, INT’L JUV. JUST. OBSERVATORY, ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY FOR YOUNG
OFFENDERS: NATIONAL REPORT ON JUVENILE JUSTICE TRENDS FINLAND 8 (2011).
124
Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 116, at 236.
125
Id. at 249.
120
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d. Turkey and “Open Prisons”
Finally, Turkey, which reformed its juvenile criminal justice system
over the last twenty years, provides a model for reformation of juvenile penal
institutions in the twenty-first century. 126 Turkey’s transition towards a more
rehabilitative juvenile justice system began with the passage of Turkey’s
Juvenile Protection Law in 2005, which aimed to “regulate the procedures
and principles with regard to protecting juveniles who are in need of
protection or who are pushed to crime, and ensuring their rights and wellbeing.” 127 In using the phrase “pushed to crime,” Turkey makes it clear that
it fundamentally views juvenile offenders as victims, rather than perpetrators.
However, Turkey retained punitive characteristics in its juvenile justice
system. Even though it was raised to twelve, Turkey still maintains a low age
of criminal responsibility. 128 Similarly to those in the United Kingdom,
adolescent offenders between the ages of twelve and fifteen are evaluated by
a forensic specialist who determines whether the child understood that what
they were doing was wrong. 129 Turkey also often detains juveniles during
pretrial proceedings. 130
Nevertheless, Turkey manages to maintain a low recidivism rate
because it detains relatively few children, and the children who are detained
are kept in “open prisons,” which “allows for juveniles to experience more
successful rehabilitation than they might otherwise receive in closed
facilities.” 131 Turkey’s “open prisons” more closely resemble boarding
schools than traditional detention centers and are used primarily for serious
offenders. 132 They emphasize education, practical work experience, physical
fitness, and community service. 133 The “open prisons” do not have fences or
barriers, and detainees attend school, training sessions, or have jobs in the
local community. 134 Residents may spend the weekend or an afternoon

126

Brenda McKinney & Lauren Salins, A Decade of Progress: Promising Models for
Children in the Turkish Juvenile Justice System, 12 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 13, 13
(2013).
127
Juvenile Protection Law, Law No.: 5395 Official Gazette, 15 July 2005, No. 25876,
enacted: 3 July 2005 (Turk.). (emphasis added).
128
McKinney & Salins, supra note 126, at 18.
129
Id. at 20.
130
Id. at 22; see also Selçuk v. Turkey, App. No. 21768/02, ¶¶ 5–18 (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-71944 (where the ECHR considered the validity of the
four-month pretrial detention of the sixteen-year-old applicant).
131
McKinney & Salins, supra note 126, at 27–28.
132
Id. at 25–26.
133
Id. at 26–27.
134
Id.

592

LAIRD

[Vol. 111

visiting family. 135 Because the living conditions in these prisons are often
better than living conditions at home, residents rarely attempt to leave or
escape. 136 These prisons prepare children for life after detention, and
recidivism rates are thus lower among previously incarcerated teenagers in
Turkey than in other countries. 137 Turkey’s open-air prisons emphasize
rehabilitative programs, and teenagers are able to grow into productive
members of society that no longer pose a threat to public safety.
2. The Organization of American States and Latin America
Like the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States (OAS)
is a regional international body that focuses on promoting democracy and
protecting human rights. 138 Within the OAS, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) is responsible for promoting and protecting
human rights. 139 And like the ECHR, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) is an autonomous judicial body that enforces the human
rights conventions adopted by OAS member states.140 This sub-section will
review how the IACHR and IACtHR have articulated and enforced principles
of juvenile justice. It will also review the system developed by Oaxaca,
Mexico, one of the OAS members states.
a. The IACHR and the IACtHR
Since the passage of the CRC, many Latin American countries have
reformed their juvenile justice systems. 141 The IACHR has consistently
recognized that the primary goal of the juvenile justice system is
rehabilitation. 142 With regard to the minimum age of criminal responsibility,
the IACHR provides more guidance than its European counterpart. 143 While
the IACHR has refrained from setting a specific age of criminal responsibility
and acknowledges that there is no clear international standard, it also says

135

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26 n.103.
137
Id. at 28.
138
About the OAS: Who We Are, ORG. AM. STATES (last visited July 26, 2020),
http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp [https://perma.cc/84QW-SSLB].
139
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ORG. AM. STATES (last visited July 26,
2020), http://www.oas.org/en/about/commission_human_rights.asp [https://perma.cc/GA3RW7F2].
140
What is the I/A Court H.R.?, INTER-AM. CT. HUM. RTS. (last visited July 26, 2020),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/que_es_la_corte.cfm?lang=en [https://perma.cc/RF7T-CUQS].
141
Beloff, supra note 3, at 98–100.
142
INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS, supra note 4, at ix.
143
See supra note 92.
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that any criminal age of responsibility below twelve is unacceptable. 144
Additionally, it notes that “the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
recommended that States set the minimum at between 14 and 16 years.” 145
In contrast to the British and Turkish systems, the IACHR specifically
condemns the use of a tiered model that recognizes multiple criminal ages of
responsibility, coupled with a determination of maturity, as “confusing.” 146
Among member states, Argentina has the highest age of responsibility at
sixteen, while Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago have the lowest age of
responsibility among member states at seven. 147
The IACtHR has also disavowed punitive rationales for juvenile
punishment and embraced rehabilitative principles. In an advisory opinion
requested by the IACHR, the IACtHR supported the principle that “children
requir[e] measures to protect their rights [and] must not be subject to punitive
treatment. On the contrary, they require prompt and careful intervention on
the part of well‐equipped and well‐staffed institutions in order to resolve their
problems or mitigate their consequences.” 148 Even more notably, in Juvenile
Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, the IACtHR found Paraguay in violation
of several conventions due to their treatment of juvenile prisoners. 149 The
country’s “Panchito López” Center, which housed juvenile prisoners, was
constantly suffering from “overpopulation, overcrowding, lack of sanitation,
inadequate infrastructure, and a prison guard staff that was both too small
and poorly trained.” 150 Additionally, Paraguay failed to keep juvenile
offenders under the age of eighteen separated from adult prisoners when a
series of fires required officials to send juvenile prisoners to adult prisons all
over the country. 151 The IACtHR found the State of Paraguay in violation of
Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 5(6), and 19 of the American Convention on Human
Rights when it determined that Paraguay failed to provide “decent living

144

INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., supra note 4, at 13.
Id.
146
INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., supra note 4, at 14–15. The IACHR also noted that
a tiered system “leaves much to the discretion of the court or judge and may result in
discriminatory practices.” Id.
147
Id. at 13–14.
148
Id. at 20 (citing Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion
OC‐17/02, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17 (Aug. 28, 2002)).
149
Juv. Reeducation Inst. v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 4 (Sept. 2, 2004).
150
Id.
151
Id. ¶ 5.
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conditions, rehabilitative programs, and care to children in State custody.” 152
Finally, the IACtHR, while recognizing that in practice many member states
fall woefully short, reaffirmed the CRC’s language that incarceration “must
be used only as a last resort and only by way of exception, and for as short a
time as possible.” 153 Thus, the IACHR and IACtHR have consistently
promoted rehabilitative principles of juvenile justice.
b. Mexico and Oaxaca
Upon ratification of the CRC, the Mexican government amended its
constitution and directed its states to develop juvenile justice systems in
accordance with the principles outlined in the CRC. 154 In anticipation of the
amendment, Oaxaca, a state to the southwest of Mexico City, developed a
system that served as a model for the rest of the country. 155 Oaxaca, due to
cultural norms 156 and the financial and geographic constraints of the region,
emphasized rehabilitative principles in Oaxaca’s Penal Code for
Adolescents, which was passed in 2007. 157
152
Ava Rubin, Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, 38 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. REV. 1446, 1455–56 (2016); see also Juvenile Reeducation Inst., Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶¶ 176, 340. Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights
states, “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by
law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life.” American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, S. Treaty Doc. No.
95-21, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Article 5(1) is “[e]very person has the right to have his physical,
mental, and moral integrity respected”; 5(2) states, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”; and 5(6) states
“[p]unishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform
and social readaptation of the prisoners.” Id. art. 5. Article 19 states, “[e]very minor child has
the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his
family, society, and the state.” Id. art. 19.
153
Juvenile Reeducation Inst., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 231; INTER-AM.
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., supra note 4, at 22.
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Beth Caldwell, Punishment v. Restoration: A Comparative Analysis of Juvenile
Delinquency Law in the United States and Mexico, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 105,
109 (2011) (“In 2005, Article 18 of the Mexican Constitution was modified to require each
state to design and implement a juvenile delinquency system that operates separately from the
adult criminal justice system.”).
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Id. at 112 (“Oaxaca has received national attention for the extent to which mediation
and restorative justice processes are utilized to address juvenile crime. Because of this
innovative approach, Oaxaca’s Penal Code for Adolescents has been referred to as a model
for other states.”).
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Id. at 115 (“The prevalence of indigenous people and cultures in Oaxaca contributes
to a world-view that prioritizes dialogue and community responses to problems that are similar
in many ways to restorative justice conferences.”).
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Id. at 115, 112 n.35.
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Instead of setting a single age of criminal responsibility that would
determine when a child could be detained, Oaxaca created a tiered approach.
The Oaxacan Penal Code excludes any children younger than twelve from
the juvenile criminal justice system. 158 From twelve until fourteen, children
may be held criminally accountable, but detention is prohibited. 159 Finally,
from ages fourteen until eighteen, children may be incarcerated if convicted
of a limited list of crimes. 160 However, fourteen to sixteen-year-olds may
only be incarcerated for a maximum of four years, and seventeen to eighteenyear-olds may only be incarcerated for a maximum of seven to ten years. 161
These tiers were designed to track with a youth’s “capacity to understand the
wrongfulness of their actions and to engage in higher order reasoning.” 162 As
of January 2010, Oaxaca only had thirty-five youth offenders incarcerated. 163
3. The United States
Illinois pioneered rehabilitative juvenile justice when it set up the first
juvenile justice system in 1899. 164 Within twenty-five years, all but two states
had adopted similar systems. 165 However, during the 1980s, the United States
moved from a rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice to a system focused
on retributive justice. 166 This followed a national trend towards more punitive
criminal justice models and marked the most substantial growth in youth
imprisonment in the history of American crime policy. 167 Between 1971 and
1995, the incarceration rate of juveniles increased by over forty percent. 168
Today, the United States’ juvenile incarceration rate remains “five times
higher than South Africa . . . seven times greater than England and Wales,
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160
Id. at 133–34 (“Youth ages fourteen to sixteen may only be detained for committing
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thirteen times greater than Australia, eighteen times greater than France, and
over three thousand times greater than Japan.” 169
The United States’ high juvenile incarceration rate is not the only thing
that makes it stand out in the criminal justice context. It was not until 2005
that the United States Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty for juvenile
offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. 170 Furthermore, despite the limits
imposed by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 171 juvenile life without
parole remains legal in the United States to this day. 172 Among the states,
only nineteen have minimum ages of criminal responsibility. 173 The lowest
minimum age is seven in Oklahoma, and both Nevada and Washington
consider eight the minimum age of criminal responsibility. 174 And as of 2007,
forty-six states had waiver laws that allowed states to prosecute minors as
adults, either through categorical exclusions for certain offenses or through
prosecutorial discretion. 175
Additionally, while juvenile offenders are often separated from adult
offenders, this is frequently at the discretion of judges, and juvenile detention

169

Jacqueline L. Bullard & Kimberly E. Dvorchak, Juvenile Appeals: A Promising Legal
Strategy to Reduce Youth Incarceration, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 403, 406–07 (2015). These high
incarceration rates show the continuing influence that retributive ideologies have on American
juvenile justice systems, even when compared to other relatively retributive models like the
United Kingdom and France. Id.
170
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). This is remarkable because at the time,
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to the juvenile death penalty.” Id. at 575.
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at 479–80.
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be Tried in Criminal Court?, 16 NCJJ SNAPSHOT (2011) (“Alabama, California, Colorado,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington.”)
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YOUTH IN ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 3 (2011). Juvenile waiver laws, which allow
juvenile offenders to be tried as adults for certain crimes, rose to prominence within the 1980s
retributive justice movement because they were thought to deter juvenile offenses and reduce
recidivism. Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to
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facilities mirror adult facilities. 176 Since 2000, twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia have all documented instances of maltreatment of
juvenile prisoners, including “systemic violence, [physical and sexual]
abuse, and excessive use of isolation or restraints.” 177 Even in model juvenile
detention systems, such as Ohio’s, access to rehabilitation resources are
limited, and gangs may control the rehabilitative resources. 178 Finally,
although children might be initially charged with abbreviated sentences, they
will often also be charged with a suspended adult sentence if they misbehave
in prison. 179 Despite recent decisions by the Supreme Court, the United
States’ juvenile justice systems remain uniquely punitive and fail to embody
rehabilitative ideals.
B. THE PROPER JUVENILE INCARCERATION MODEL FOR THE UNITED
STATES

In light of the unique issues of competency that plague juvenile criminal
justice and the rehabilitative rationale that it recognizes as the core of the
juvenile justice system, the United States’ punitive systems provide
inadequate protections for youth when compared to the systems adopted by
many member states in the Council of Europe and the Organization of
American States. In order to move their juvenile justice systems into the
twenty-first century so that they better reflect rehabilitative ideals and the
modern-day scientific consensus regarding children and adolescents, states
should reform their juvenile justice systems by (1) establishing a statutory
minimum criminal age of responsibility no lower than twelve that precludes
children without some degree of autonomy from entering the juvenile justice
system; (2) installing a tiered sentencing structure that reflects the growth of
autonomy and culpability experienced by adolescents throughout their
teenage years to guide the discretion of individual judges; (3) restricting the
number of crimes for which incarceration is a sentencing option to those
violent crimes that are not phase-specific violations unique to the adolescent
experience; (4) creating additional diversionary programs that emphasize
community service, education, and physical and mental fitness without

176
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requiring incarceration; and (5) restricting the incarceration of juvenile
offenders to special reform prisons that emphasize rehabilitative ideals.
1. A Responsible Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility
A minimum age of criminal responsibility of twelve reflects the modern
scientific consensus that until their preteen years, children do not strive to be
autonomous and are dependent on their parents. 180 It reflects the data that
children twelve and younger commit significantly fewer crimes than
adolescents. 181 It also reflects the age when teenagers begin to become
independent, rationally thinking members of society, and it lines up with
other significant transitions that occur during childhood: the development of
an outside social group that exerts peer pressure, puberty, and the transition
from elementary to secondary schooling. 182
A minimum criminal age of responsibility of twelve also allows states
to realize the rehabilitative ideals of the juvenile justice system by keeping
children too young to have any degree of culpability from entering the
system. 183 It recognizes the transitory nature of childhood and prevents the
criminal justice system from having jurisdiction over people without
agency. 184 It also reflects the growing international consensus that any
criminal age of responsibility below twelve is too low. The IACHR, for
instance has explicitly recognized that any criminal age of responsibility
below twelve is too low. 185 And although the ECHR has notably abdicated
its responsibility to set a minimum age for its member states, even that court
has recognized that age is a crucial element of a juvenile’s competency to
stand trial. 186 Additionally, the majority of member states in the Council of
Europe have set the criminal age of responsibility at or above the age of
twelve. 187 In many instances, member states, such as the Scandinavian
180
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(last visited Mar. 7, 2021), https://archive.crin.org/en/home/ages/europe.html [https://perma.
cc/8HWR-322G]. Among the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe, only four
states do not have minimum ages of criminal responsibility at or above the age of twelve. Id.
France does not have a minimum age of responsibility, but only allows criminal sentences to
be imposed on children at least thirteen years old. Code Pénal [C. Pén.] [Penal Code] art. 1228 (Fr.). Ireland has a minimum age of responsibility of ten for the crimes of murder,
181

2021]

A BLUEPRINT FOR REHABILITATIVE REFORM

599

countries, have actually set the age of criminal responsibility even higher in
order to better reflect their interpretation of the rehabilitative rationale for
juvenile justice. 188 In order to better reflect the international norms governing
the treatment of children and to better protect children from the jurisdiction
of the criminal justice system, states should set a minimum criminal age of
responsibility of at least twelve years old.
2. A Tiered Approach
It is also clear that once a person turns twelve, they are not immediately
fully autonomous individuals. Instead, adolescents go through a period of
semi-autonomy, beginning in their preteen years and continuing until
adulthood. 189 The competency of an individual will always be an
individualized investigation. As a result, a blanket approach for all teenagers
with regard to competency would be too rigid. However, a tiered approach
to the sentence lengths for juveniles would provide more relevant sentencing
parameters for judges evaluating juvenile competency.
Oaxaca, Mexico, provides a clear example for states seeking to create a
tiered sentencing structure for adolescent offenders. Oaxaca has a minimum
criminal age of responsibility at twelve, but three separate sentencing tiers
for twelve to fourteen-year-olds, fourteen to sixteen-year-olds, and sixteen to
eighteen-year-olds. 190 Oaxacan authorities restrict incarceration options to
adolescents fourteen or older and have an abbreviated sentencing structure

manslaughter, rape, and aggravated sexual assault, but otherwise recognizes a minimum age
of criminal responsibility of twelve. Criminal Justice Act 2006 (Act No. 26/2006) § 129 (Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2006/act/26/section/129/enacted/en/html#sec129 [https://p
erma.cc/4H6L-YSB2]; Children and the Criminal Justice System, CITIZEN INFO. BD.,
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/justice/children_and_young_offenders/children_and_
the_criminal_justice_system_in_ireland.html [https://perma.cc/W8NM-7ZW7] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2021). Switzerland and the majority of the United Kingdom (England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland) all have a minimum age of criminal responsibility of ten. Schweizerisches
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], Code Pénal Suisse [CP], Codice Penale Svizzero [CP], June 20, 2003,
SR 311.1 art. 3(1) (Switz.); Children and Young Persons Act 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5 ch. 12 §
50 (Gr. Brit.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/23-24/12 [https://perma.cc/6AAQ2K7L]; Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, SI 1998/1504 (N.I. 9) art.
3, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisi/1998/1504/article/3 [https://perma.cc/K89Z-GQPM].
Scotland allows criminal liability for children as young as eight but does not allow criminal
prosecution of children until the age of twelve. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (ASP
13) §§ 41, 41A(1)–(2), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/46/contents [https://perma.
cc/ZGF8-JM9U].
188
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189
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for fourteen to sixteen-year-old adolescents. 191 This allows Oaxaca to
emphasize community-based rehabilitation programs and minimize the
incarcerated juvenile population. It also more closely reflects the transition
adolescents go through in their teenage years, as they develop greater
competency to stand trial and be held accountable for their actions. Oaxaca’s
formal tiered system also mirrors the practical effects of Finland and
Sweden’s juvenile justice systems, as both countries have significantly fewer
offenders incarcerated between the ages of fifteen and seventeen than
seventeen to twenty. 192 Both models are consistent with the ECHR’s edict
that it is “essential that a child charged with an offence [be] dealt with in a
manner which takes full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual
and emotional capacities.” 193 States should adopt a tiered approach to
juvenile sentencing based on both the offender’s age and offense that reflects
adolescents’ semi-autonomy and limited competency.
3. Minimizing Incarceration
In addition to raising the criminal age of responsibility and creating a
tiered approach to sentencing, states should limit the crimes that make
adolescent offenders eligible for incarceration. Although the primary goal of
juvenile justice systems is rehabilitation, there is admittedly a secondary
deterrence rationale that justifies the incarceration of juvenile offenders in
limited circumstances. However, these circumstances are restricted to those
violent crimes where recidivism is more likely: crimes such as murder, rape,
and aggravated assault. 194 Other crimes, like property-related crimes, fall
under a category of “phase-specific” offenses that adolescents are likely to
grow out of and never repeat. 195
In a related context, this dichotomy has already been recognized by the
Supreme Court, which has held that life without parole sentences can only be
applied to individuals where rehabilitation is not possible and recidivism is
very likely. 196 Similarly, where a teenager was expelled from Austria for
minor offenses, the ECHR overturned the expulsion because the acts
committed by the minor could still be “regarded as acts of juvenile
191
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delinquency.” 197 This approach is also used by Finland, which reserves
incarceration remedies only for the most “extraordinary” cases.198 Finally,
again, Oaxaca, Mexico, is a model of restraint when it comes to incarcerating
juveniles. The Oaxacan Penal Code provides incarceration as an option only
in cases where the adolescent has committed rape, battery causing injury,
homicide, robbery involving physical violence, kidnapping, or human
trafficking of children. 199 By limiting the crimes adolescents could be
incarcerated for, states could enhance the rehabilitative aspects of their
juvenile justice systems without jeopardizing public safety or increasing
recidivism.
4. Diversion
For adolescent offenders who fall into the juvenile justice system but
who are not incarcerated, state juvenile justice systems should offer robust
rehabilitative programs. In an advisory opinion, the IACHR has held that
“children requir[e] . . . prompt and careful intervention on the part of well‐
equipped and well‐staffed institutions in order to resolve their problems or
mitigate their consequences.” 200 This principle has found its way into
Scandinavian models for juvenile justice as well, where probation and fines
are the primary forms of intervention. 201 Similarly, Denmark prescribes
activities for youth offenders as part of their child welfare system. 202
Programs modeled after these examples could also be augmented by proven
programs like clinical family intervention and therapeutic foster care.203 By
investing in robust programs outside of detention centers, states could
provide rehabilitative services for adolescents who do not need to be
incarcerated.
5. Reimagined Juvenile Detention Centers
Finally, states should reimagine the juvenile detention centers they do
retain. Juvenile prisons should not be miniature adult prisons, but rather
rehabilitative centers that emphasize education, community service,
developing professional skills, and mental and physical health. Here, Turkey
provides an aspirational model for the United States. In Turkey, the open-air
197
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prisons resemble boarding schools and provide rehabilitative models for
detainees within and outside the prison. 204 There are robust educational
opportunities, and adolescents often have apprenticeships in the local
community. 205 Turkey’s open-air prisons also provide psychological services
to detainees and emphasize healthy living and physical fitness. 206 Nightly
curfews and restrictions on adolescents’ ability to go home still keep checks
on potentially dangerous offenders while simultaneously recognizing the
rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system. 207 By embracing an opendetention center ideal for juvenile centers in the United States, states could
reduce the negative impacts that detention centers currently have on
adolescents.
III. CONCLUSION
Juvenile offenders, as a product of their age, lack the agency and
competency to be held fully accountable for criminal actions. These
biological facts about adolescents reinforce the traditional rehabilitative
goals of juvenile justice and challenge the retributive models adopted by
some countries. The ECHR has recognized the rights of juveniles to have
their age taken into account, and though it has refrained from dictating a
criminal age of responsibility, it has consistently emphasized the
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice. 208 Across the pond, the IACHR has
taken it a step further by setting a minimum criminal age of responsibility at
twelve and emphasizing rehabilitative prison conditions for juveniles. 209
Though the home of the original juvenile justice system, the United States
has lagged behind both the Council of Europe and the Organization of
American States. The United States has failed to realize the lofty
rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice and to take into account the fluid nature
and degree of adolescents’ autonomy and culpability. To correct these
failures, American states should (1) comply with the IACHR’s mandate and
raise their criminal age of responsibility to at least twelve; (2) create a tiered
sentencing model for adolescent offenders that resembles Oaxaca’s,
Sweden’s, and Finland’s; (3) reduce the number of offenses that make
adolescents eligible for incarceration; (4) increase rehabilitative alternatives
to incarceration; and (5) reform juvenile detention centers to give adolescents
204
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the ability to invest in their community, mental and physical fitness,
education, and professional skills.

